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IMPEACHING A DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
BY PROOF OF POST-ARREST SILENCE:
DOYLE V. OHIO
N Doyle v. Ohio,' THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE of the fourteenth amendment was violated by the attempt of
the prosecutor to impeach the trial testimony of the defendant by intro-
ducing evidence of his silence after he had been arrested and given
the Miranda warnings.2 The Court declared that it is fundamentally
unfair to allow post-arrest silence to be used to discredit a defendant's
testimony, and reasoned that since the state is required to advise the
arrestee that he has the right to remain silent, silence which follows
the warning may be an exercise of that right.' The Court also found that
the warning contains an implicit assurance that silence will carry no
penalty. 4
The Doyle opinion decisively eliminates the controversy which
surrounded impeachment by post-arrest silence. This controversy
stemmed from conflict between two considerations regarding silence
at the time of arrest. (1) An arrestee's silence may have some evi-
dentiary value when he later elects to exculpate himself at trial, and
inquiry regarding his silence may be deemed the proper subject of
cross-examination. (2) On the other hand, an arrestee has a constitu-
tional right to remain silent, 5 and the subsequent use of the exercise
of this right to create an inference of guilt at trial may be deemed con-
stitutionally reprehensible.
In Doyle, the majority did not undertake an exhaustive analysis of
the considerations puzzled over at length by other courts which consid-
ered this issue; indeed, the statement in Doyle that impeachment by
post-arrest silence violates due process concludes a process of delibera-
tion begun by the Court in United States v. Hale.6 The Court in Hale
had addressed the same issue before the Court in Doyle, with the signif-
icant difference that the Hale trial had taken place in a federal court.7
The Court in Hale was faced with two options. The first of these was
to discuss the issue in terms of its constitutional significance, and
hold the questioned impeachment procedure permissible or impermis-
1 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
3 96 S. Ct. at 2244-45.
4 Id.
5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
6 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
Justice Marshall, writing for the Hale majority, noted that:
[Hale] was tried in Federal District Court prior to the effective date for the transfer
of jurisdiction over the D.C. Code offenses under the District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.
Id. at 172 n.1. See Kern, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970: A
Dose of Conventional Wisdom and a Dash of Innovation, 20 AM. U. L. REv. 237, 240-42
(1971).
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sible on constitutional grounds. 8 The second option was to resolve the
issue on the basis of the Court's supervisory powers over the lower
federal courts.9 This approach would enable the Court to deal with
the impeachment issue as an exercise of the Court's authority to super-
vise the procedures within the federal court system, and thus avoid the
constitutional issue inherent in impeachment by post-arrest silence.
The Hale Court adopted the latter approach, and it proved deficient.
Though the Court in Hale undertook a scholarly and extensive analysis
of the problems surrounding impeachment by post-arrest silence, the
holding of the Court was based only on evidentiary considerations and
did not address the constitutional issue which was at the heart of the
controversy in the lower courts.
Doyle presents the Court's definitive resolution of the controversy.
The primary service of the Doyle Court was to address the issue which
the Hale Court avoided; that is, to set a strong precedent based on the
Hale majority analysis and the due process rationale advanced by Jus-
tice White in his Hale concurrence.10 Doyle is the precedent which
controls state and federal court proceedings.
This Note will attempt to outline the genesis of the issue of impeach-
ment by post-arrest silence by first discussing the various inquiries into
the probative value of silence which had been undertaken by courts on
the federal level before Hale. The focus will then shift to the Hale Court's
treatment of this issue. The constitutional aspects of the issue will then
be discussed, and the pronouncement of the Doyle Court will be ana-
lyzed with an emphasis on the continuity between the Hale and Doyle,
decisions.
I. United States v. Hale: THE EVIDENTIARY ASPECTS
OF IMPEACHMENT BY SILENCE
William Hale was arrested after having been identified by a man who
had been robbed of $96. He was taken to a police station, advised of
his right to remain silent, and searched. The search revealed that he
had $158 in his possession. When the police asked how he had obtained
the money, Hale made no response." Eventually he was indicted, and
tried for robbery.
At his trial in the Federal District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, 12 Hale took the stand and asserted his innocence. He testified
that his estranged wife had just received her welfare check the day of
the robbery and, as she had done on several prior occasions, had given
him about $150 to purchase money orders for her. 13 On cross-examina-
' 422 U.S. at 173.
9 Id. at 181.
10 Id. at 182-83.
11 Id. at 174.
12 See note 7 supra.
13 422 U.S. at 174. Hale's estranged wife corroborated this testimony. United States v.
Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Hale,
422 U.S. 171 (1975).
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tion the prosecutor attempted to impeach Hale's testimony regarding his
possession of the money by eliciting from him the admission that he had
not offered this exculpatory information to the police when he was
arrested and had responded to police questioning about the money
by remaining silent. 14 After Hale's admission, his attorney moved for
a mistrial, but it was denied.' 5 Instead, the trial judge instructed the
jury that the questioning was improper and told them to disregard the
question and Hale's answer.' 6 Hale was subsequently convicted, given
a suspended sentence, and placed on three years probation.17 Shortly
thereafter, Hale appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, contending that the use of his pre-trial silence against
him at trial constituted reversible error.'8 The court of appeals reversed
his conviction,' 9 finding support in Miranda v. Arizona,20 Griffin v.
California,21 and Grunewald v. United States22 for its conclusion that
the use of the defendant's pre-trial silence to impeach his testimony was,
under the fifth amendment, constitutionally impermissible.2 3 In so
holding, the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that it was
merely following a trend set by other federal courts of appeals
24
prohibiting the use of silence at trial by relying on a dictum in the
Supreme Court's Miranda decision:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
14 The colloquy between the prosecutor and Hale included the following exchange:
Q. Did you in any way indicate [to the police] where that money came from?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Why not?
A. I didn't feel that it was necessary at the time.
422 U.S. at 174.
15 Id. at 172-73.
16 The court of appeals found that the instruction of the trial judge regarding the use
of the defendant's silence to impeach him was not effectively curative in this case, but
rather, the prejudicial effect of re-emphasizing the fact of the defendant's silence to the
jury actually aggravated the harm to the defendant. 498 F.2d at 1045.
17 Id. at 1039.
I Id. at 1040.
19 Id. at 1039.
20 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
22 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
2 498 F.2d at 1040-44. The court cited Grunewald as one authority for its decision
favoring Hale. Grunewald was not decided on constitutional grounds, but was decided
as an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority over the lower federal courts.
Therefore, although the four concurring Justices in Grunewald urged that the issue be
decided on constitutional grounds, Grunewald cannot technically be used as authority to
support a constitutional holding.
24 Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973);
United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d
48 (9th Cir. 1969).
The First Circuit held before Miranda that such impeachment by use of prior silence
was not proper. Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965). The Seventh
and Eighth Circuits have not yet dealt with this issue, and the Fourth Circuit has not di-
rectly considered the issue. See United States v. White, 377 F.2d 908, 910-11 (4th Cir.
1967). But cf. United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1974). See notes 32-51
infra and accompanying text for the position of the Third and Fifth Circuits.
1976]
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he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation. 25
When Hale reached the Supreme Court on certiorari many expected
the Court's final determination to be constitutionally significant. To
their surprise, the Court's opinion in Hale skirted the constitutional
issue that the circuit court had focused upon. Instead, the Hale Court's
opinion developed along traditional pre-Miranda guidelines for the
use of an accused's silence to impeach his credibility at trial. Chief
Justice Burger, who concurred in the unanimous decision of the Court,
stated that a potential "tempest in a saucer"2 6 was rightly avoided by
the Court's decision not to investigate the constitutional aspects of
using an arrestee's silence to impeach his testimony at trial. 27 The
Court in Hale found that Hale's silence could be attributed to a number
of factors, and was not necessarily inconsistent with his trial testimony.2 8
The Court concluded that Hale's silence was not probative of his cred-
ibility, and therefore, impeachment by reference to his post-arrest si-
lence waS not permissible.29 By deciding the case for the defendant on
such narrow evidentiary grounds, and emphasizing the uniqueness of the
particular fact situation, the Court did not set a strong precedent in Hale.
In fact, the Court only postponed until Doyle v. Ohio the inevitable con-
frontation with the constitutional considerations surrounding the use of
an arrestee's silence to impeach his trial testimony. 30
A. Pre-Hale Inquiries into the Probative Value of Silence
The majority of federal courts of appeals confronted with the use of
an arrestee's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes before United
States v. Hale had, like the District of Columbia Circuit Court, disal-
lowed such use on constitutional grounds.31  Two circuit courts, the
Fifth and Third, had determined, however, that a constitutional resolu-
tion of the issue was not mandatory, and had initiated the type of
inquiry into the evidentiary value of the arrestee's silence that was
eventually undertaken by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hale.
1. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Ramirez that a defendant's
silence upon arrest could appear so inconsistent with his later exculpa-
25 384 U.S. at 468 n.37. Since none of the four cases joined before the Court in
Miranda involved the use of the defendant's silence under police interrogation as part of
the government's case against him, the Court's statement in this footnote is clearly dictum,
and will be referred to hereinafter as the "Miranda dictum."
26 422 U.S. at 181 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
27 Id. at 175 n.4.
1s Id. at 177-80.
29 Id. at 180.
30 See notes 98-196 infra and accompanying text for full treatment of the Court's ap-
proach to the constitutional issues in Doyle.
11 See note 24 supra.
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tory explanation at trial that prosecutorial questioning on his silence
would constitute valid impeachment of the defendant's credibility.
32
Ramirez was arrested for the sale of heroin, and did not offer any
explanation to the police at the time of his arrest. Ramirez took the
stand at his trial and testified that he had been forced to sell heroin
by strangers from Mexico who had threatened to harm him and his
family if he did not co-operate. Ramirez further testified that he actually
wanted to be apprehended so that he would no longer be compelled
to sell heroin. When he was cross-examined, the prosecutor elicited
from him that he had not offered this "Mexican-coercion" explanation
to the police when he was arrested. 33 Subsequently, Ramirez was con-
victed and appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The circuit court was apparently cognizant of the constitutional is-
sues raised, but the court held that the Miranda dictum was not ap-
plicable.34 Instead, the Ramirez court seized upon United States v.
Harris25 as authority for its allowance of the prosecution's use of
Ramirez' post-arrest silence as a prior inconsistent statement because
Ramirez had attested to his innocence at trial. The Ramirez court's
reliance on Harris, however, was misplaced. The statement used to
32 411 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
33 The following colloquy occurred in the trial court between the prosecutor and Ra-
mirez:
Q. All right and you didn't tell a single one of those [police officers] this story
that you have told from the witness stand this morning, did you?
A. At that moment I didn't think so.
Q. In fact you never have told that story to any officer, that you told on the stand
today?
A. No.
Id. at 953.
31 Id. at 954. The existence of this constitutional dimension had not been recognized
by the Fifth Circuit prior to Ramirez. See Sharp v. United States, 410 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Pledger, 409 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1969). And the fact that Ra-
mirez did not recognize the applicability of the policies voiced in Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965), regarding the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
creates some doubt whether the Ramirez court appreciated all the constitutional aspects
of the issue before it. See notes 138-60 infra and accompanying discussion in text.
35 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). In Harris, the defendant was arrested and charged with
the sale of heroin, was not informed of his Miranda rights, and gave incriminating answers
to certain questions asked by police immediately after his arrest. At trial he claimed he
did in fact sell a glassine bag to an undercover agent, but that he believed it contained
baking powder and was part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser. The Court in Harris
held that even though statements made by an arrestee before he was informed of his
Miranda rights were not admissible against him in the government's case-in-chief, he could
be impeached by such statements during cross-examination if the statements were deter-
mined to be inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority in Harris, had reasoned that the safeguards provided by Miranda could not
be used by a defendant to enable him to commit perjury in shaping a defense.
The Court in Harris relied heavily on Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), in
which the Court permitted physical evidence, inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-
chief, to be used for impeachment purposes. The Court saw no difference in principle
from the fact that Walder was impeached on collateral matters included in his direct
examination, whereas the defendant in Harris was impeached on testimony bearing di-
rectly on the crimes with which he had been charged. 401 U.S. at 225.
For a critical appraisal of the Court's reasoning in Harris, see Dershowitz & Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emnerg-
ing Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J, 1198 (1971).
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impeach the defendant's credibility in Harris was prima facie in-
consistent with his trial testimony and tended to show that the de-
fendant was perjuring himself.36 The silence of an arrestee, however,
cannot be deemed inconsistent per se because of the acknowledged
ambiguity of silence in the arrest situation.3 7 In addition, the Supreme
Court's use of the words "utterance" and "statement" interchangeably
in Harris indicated that their holding would not be directly applicable
to a situation in which it is the defendant's silence, rather than an
utterance, that comprises the evidence sought to be admitted for im-
peachment purposes.3 8 Furthermore, the Court in Harris allowed the
prosecution to make limited use of statements made by the defendant
before he had been apprised of his Miranda rights. By contrast, in
Ramirez, the silence in question was due to the defendant's failure to
explain his situation to the police, and it is irrelevant to the court's
inquiry whether Ramirez had been apprised of his Miranda rights or
not.3 9 Thus the applicability of the Court's limited holding in Harris
to the situation of a defendant subjected to impeachment by his
silence at the time of arrest is questionable without at least a de-
termination that the accused's silence was an inconsistent statement or
utterance within the meaning of Harris and that the silence occurred
before the defendant had been apprised of his Miranda rights.
The most serious omission of the Ramirez court, however, was its
lack of discussion of the factors which could have influenced the de-
cision of the accused to remain silent when arrested. The court's abrupt
conclusion, unsupported by any reasoning, that a defendant who offers
a defense of coercion subjects himself to impeachment at trial by his
pretrial silence,40 was too hasty. The Ramirez court did not even inquire
into the possible motivations for keeping silent, but rather seemed to
have been totally won over by the prosecutor's argument to the jury
at trial that Ramirez must have been lying "since a man actually under
duress and fearful for his family's safety would have informed the
police of such a dangerous situation upon being apprehended."'" In
short, Ramirez' testimony that he desired to get caught seemed to
ignite the spark of incredulity which fired the Ramirez court's fervor
to apply Harris in order that Ramirez not be allowed to get away with
an apparent perjury.
36 401 U.S. at 223.
3' See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975).
31 If somehow it is determined that an arrestee's silence is an "inconsistent statement"
for purposes of Harris-type impeachment, there is an important policy reason for not
finding Harris analogous to the situation presented in Hale, Doyle, or Ramirez. The
exclusionary rule was not applied to the defendant's statements in Harris because the
use of this evidence to impeach would not have the effect of significantly increasing police
infringement on the constitutional rights of arrestees. 401 U.S. at 225. Allowing an ar-
restee's silence into evidence by means of impeachment, however, would enable the
police to badger a defendant in a way already deplored by the Warren Court in Miranda.
384 U.S. at 468. See notes 113-16 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Doyle Court's treatment of Harris.
39 441 F.2d at 953.
40 Id. at 954.
41 Id.
[Vol. 25:261
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The Fifth Circuit later qualified the position it took in Ramirez,
when in United States v. Fairchild4 it set out the "blatant inconsis-
tency" test:
[T]o be admissible, keeping silence must be much more than
ambiguous. It must appear to be an act blatantly inconsistent
with the defendant's trial testimony . . . . [which testimony
must be] of such a character that reasonable men would be
left with the distinct impression that had it been true it would
have been related to law enforcement authorities even though
the defendant was specifically informed that he need not
speak. 3
By raising the standard of permissible impeachment by silence from
that of "inconsistency" to "blatant inconsistency," the Fifth Circuit
impliedly called for a more stringent investigation into the reasonable-
ness of the accused's silence at the time of arrest than it had undertaken
in Ramirez. In Fairchild, the court undertook an inquiry into possible
explanations for the defendant's silence, concluding that, under the
circumstances, Fairchild "did what a reasonable man could be expected
to do - he remained silent." 4 4
2. Third Circuit
The only other circuit court of appeals to allow impeachment of a
defendant's testimony by use of silence was the Third Circuit in United
States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey.45 The silence about which the de-
fendant in Burt was cross-examined occurred when he had been ar-
rested for breaking and entering. He was ultimately tried for and con-
victed of second degree murder. 46  The Burt court stated that even
42 505 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1975).
4 Id. at 1382 (emphasis in original). Although the impeachment by post-arrest si-
lence was found to be improper, the Fairchild court determined that, since no objection
was raised, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to give a sua sponte cor-
rective instruction. Thus the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction.
11 Id. at 1382. Undoubtedly a large factor in the defendant's favor was that, immedi-
ately prior to his arrest, he had offered a police detective and an FBI agent the same story
which he later told in an expanded form from the witness stand at his trial. Thus, the
danger of fabrication of testimony which might militate for impeachment by the defen-
dant's silence at the time of arrest was not present in this situation, and this seems to have
dictated the court's conclusion that the impeachment by silence was impermissible. See
United States v. Harp, 513 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1975), decided shortly before Hale. In Harp,
the Fifth Circuit found that it was proper to impeach the testimony of convicts who had
been apprehended while allegedly trying to escape and who claimed at trial that they were
kidnapped by another convict and acted according to his escape plan while under duress.
The Harp court found "no possible rational explanation" for the defendants' failure to ex-
plain these peculiar circumstances when apprehended. Id. at 790 n.7. Though the Harp
court's method of inquiry seems aligned with the subsequent Hale opinion, the defendants
in Harp were already convicts, and thus the policies voiced in Hale regarding the plight of
an arrestee and the chance for immediate release by volunteering exculpatory explana-
tions are not applicable. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text. The peculiarity
of the fact situation in Harp limits its precedential value.
4, 475 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973).
40 The defendant Burt had been found sleeping in a store by police who had been alerted
to the presence of an intruder by a broken window. He was arrested and detained solely
1976]
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though the defendant was not questioned regarding his involvement in
the murder at the time of his arrest, "there was no reason for him
not to comment on the allegedly accidental shooting."4 7  The Burt
court found the defendant's silence inconsistent with his later testimony
about the accidental nature of the shooting, and relied on Ramirez to
support its holding that the prosecution had a right to impeach the
defendant's testimony by referring to his prior inconsistent act of re-
maining silent.48 There was some confusion in the Burt holding, how-
ever, over wvhether a defendant could actually be impeached by his
silence per se at the time of arrest, or whether he could be impeached
by his silence insofar as it was indicative of his "failure to check on
or in some way aid the person w, hom he had just shot ... "49 a kind
of silence which suggests an inconsistency between the defendant's
actions after the shooting and his later testimony.50 When the de-
fendant's silence is viewed in the light of the fact that he had not been
formally accused of murder, the applicability of the Burt case to the
issue presented in Hale, Ramirez, and like cases becomes questionable.
In a subsequent district court case which the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, the holding in Burt was interpreted to apply only to
situations in which the police interrogation did not concern the crime
for which the defendant was later indicted.51
on the charge of breaking and entering. A revolver was found on his person. Later,
police were contacted about a murder in the vicinity, and pieced together the defen-
dant's involvement, for which he was subsequently indicted while in custody. At trial,
the defendant testified that he had indeed shot the victim, "Shortv," but maintained
that the killing had been accidental, and was the result of a fight which the victim had
initiated. Id. at 234-36.
On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and the
defendant:Q. And yon didn't tell - up to the time you got to the Camden jail - you didn't
tell anybody about Shorty, did you?
A. No Sir.Q. Did you tell anybody about Shorty after you got to the Camden jail?
A. No, Sir.
Id. at 237.
I- Id. at 236.
44 Id.
4I Id.
50 Judge Rosenn stated in his concurring opinion in Burt that:
[t]he cross-examination was not directed at appellee's failure to speak in the face
of self-incrimination. It was aimed at his failure to act in the face of alleged in-
nocent conduct.
Id. at 238 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
51 United States v. Holland, 360 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir.
1973). The Holland court remarked that:
[u]nlike Burt, the defendant in this case was exercising his privilege in the face of
police interrogation concerning the charges lodged against him.
360 F. Supp. at 912. See also Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974), in
which Chief Judge Seitz, in his concurring opinion, distinguished the situation in Burt
from the situation of an arrestee who remains silent as in Hale:
There are, of course, peculiar circumstances such as found in Burt where we are
concerned not with a defendant's failure to offer an exculpatory statement to re-
but an accusation but with his failure to act, to summon help in that case.
Id. at 729. There was considerable doubt in Agnellino over the precise nature of the is-
sue before the court. The lead opinion held that the prosecution could comment on the
[Vol. 25:261
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It is evident from the above discussion that those federal courts of
appeals that had not chosen to disallow impeachment by use of post-
arrest silence on constitutional grounds were still struggling to develop
criteria for such use of silence. The Hale Court addressed itself to the
evidentiary problems encountered in determining the factors which gov-
ern the admissibility of silence for impeachment purposes.
B. The Hale Majority Opiniion
1. The Evidentiary Issue
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Hale to clear
up the conflict among the federal courts of appeals regarding the pro-
priety of impeachment by post-arrest silence. 52  The Hale Court at-
tempted to resolve this dispute by formulating the issue before it as
a purely evidentiary one, even though it acknowledged that the "grave
constitutional overtones" of the issue contributed to its importance.5"
In pursuing its evidentiary analysis, however, the Court made several
omissions that enervated its holding in Hale and effectively left the
lower courts without any clear guidance on the use of post-arrest silence.
The first of these omissions occurred in the Court's treatment of
silence as an inconsistent statement. The Court grounded its discussion
of the probative value of silence in a "basic rule of evidence"54 found
in Wigmore:
[p]rior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness. As a preliminary matter, however, the
court must be persuaded that the statements are indeed in-
consistent. 55
The Hale Court's ready acceptance of Wigmore's classification of silence
as a "statement" for purposes of impeachment is troubling. In fact,
there seems to be some authority for not classifying post-arrest silence
as a statement. The framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for
example, recognized the difficulties inherent in classifying certain types
of nonverbal behavior as statements for purposes of the hearsay rules.
5 6
Rule 801(a) defines "statement" as: "(1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
defendant's failure when arrested to assert the alibi he later offered at trial. The other
two judges concurred, but expressed the view that the prosecutor had commented on the
difference between the defendant's statements after arrest and the explanation he of-
fered at trial, rather than on the defendant's silence at the time of arrest. Due to this
confusion in the Agnellino court, the bearing of Agnellino on the present discussion is
questionable.
52 422 U.S. 171, 173 (1975).
-3 Id. at 180 n.7.
-4 Id. at 176.
55 Id. citing to 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). Wig-
more's definition of "inconsistent statement" includes behavior, and thus clearly includes
silence. Also listed are utterances under oath, admissions, confessions, and joint writings.
56 FED. R. EVID. 801. The Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect July 1, 1975.
The Hale opinion was handed down June 23, 1975.
1976]
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assertion." 57  The rule focuses on the intent of the hearsay declarant
to determine whether an instance of nonverbal behavior qualifies as a
statement by that person. Under this definition, silence at the time of
arrest, which has been widely considered not to be an admission in
criminal cases because of the fifth amendment right to remain silent, 58
could not seem to qualify as a statement for hearsay purposes either.
The ever-present possibility that the arrestee is relying on his Miranda
right to remain silent effectively blocks any inquiry regarding his intent
to assert something by his silence unless the defendant voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights.59 The Court in Hale was not concerned
with a hearsay problem, and thus need not have been concerned with
Rule 801. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion might have been more
convincing and authoritative had it explicity set out its reasons for deter-
mining that the admittedly ambiguous silence was a "statement" at all.
The second of the Court's omissions was its selective use of Wig-
more's pronouncements to form the foundation of its evidentiary analy-
sis. The Court cited Wigmore throughout its discussion of what proba-
tive weight can be attached to silence, and concurred with Wigmore's ob-
servations that silence per se is a poor index of a person's agreement
or disagreement with statements or accusations made in his presence.60
The Court also agreed that the accused's failure to deny an in-
criminating accusation is considered probative of acquiescence only
if an objection would have been "natural" under the circumstances.6'
57 FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
" See note 65 infra. See also the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(2)(B),
FED. R. EvIm., in which the Committee discusses some reasons why tacit criminal ad-
missions lack significant probative value:
In criminal cases . . . troublesome questions have been raised by decisions holding
that failure to deny is an admission: the inference is a fairly weak one, to begin
with; silence may be motivated by advice of counsel or realization that "anything
you say may be used against you"; unusual opportunity is afforded to manufacture
evidence; and encroachment upon the privilege against self-incrimination seems
inescapably to be involved.
Id. The Committee's Note further proposed that Miranda and other due process decisions
by the Supreme Court, see note 77 infra, have resolved this problem, and thus they found
no need to specifically provide for tacit criminal admissions in the rule. Id.
5' Miranda clearly specified that a valid waiver of these rights could not be presumed
simply from silence; rather, the accused must expressly state that he is willing to make a
statement. 384 U.S. at 475.
60 422 U.S. at 176. In his discussion of the relevancy of adoptive or tacit admissions,
Wigmore explained that:
[Tihe inference of assent may safely be made only when no other explanation is
equally consistent with silence; and there is always another possible explanation
- namely, ignorance, or dissent - unless the circumstances are such that a dis-
sent would in ordinary experience have been expressed if the communication
had not been correct.
4 J. WIGMOIE, EVIDENCE § 1071 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972).
31 422 U.S. at 176. In his discussion of when silence can be an "inconsistcnt state-
ment" for purposes of impeachment, Wigmore stated:
A failure to assert a fact, when it would have been natural to assert it, amounts
in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact . . . There may be ex-
planations, indicating that the person had in truth no belief of that tenor; but the
conduct is "prima facie" an inconsistency.
3A J. WIGMOmH, EVIDENCE 0 1042 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (emphasis in original).
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Wigmore, however, has indicated that this observation about the pro-
bative value of post-arrest silence may have been made obsolete by
Miranda.62 This section of Wigmore, which seems indispensible to a
full understanding of the issue, was not cited by the Court. Pre-
sumably, the reason for this omission was the Hale Court's expressed
avoidance of the constitutional issue regarding the use of Miranda
induced silence.6 3 The fact that Wigmore acknowledged that Miranda
may have superseded some of the evidentiary principles regarding use
of an accused's silence in a criminal case, however, is an indication
from an established authority that a thorough discussion of the evi-
dentiary weight of silence is not possible without serious considera-
tion of the impact of the Miranda dictum.6 4
The Hale Court's final omission was its failure to draw the vital
distinction between use of silence as an impeachment device and use
of silence as an admission of the defendant in the prosecution's case-
in-chief. Most federal courts after Miranda, when faced with the issue
of whether a prosecutor could use evidence of post-arrest silence in his
case-in-chief against the defendant, had not undertaken an analysis of
the probative value of such silence but had uniformly prohibited its use
on fifth amendment grounds.6 5 The Hale Court, however, did not
62 In his discussion of admissions by silence, Wigmore noted that:
[c]ertain situations in particular may furnish a positive motive for silence without
regard to the truth or falsity of the statement. Whether the fact that the party was
at the time under arrest creates such a situation has been the subject of opposing
opinions ...
4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1072(4) (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972) (emphasis in original).
This section refers to the impact of the Miranda dictum. As noted in Wigmore's discus-
sion of the latest developments in confessions and admissions:
Miranda has altered certain pre-existing doctrines predicated on passive behavior,
such as silence. That this pronouncement [the Miranda dictum] may require a
state to modify its pre-existing doctrines of "tacit admissions" is becoming in-
creasingly evident.
3 J. WicMoRE, EVIDENCE § 821 n.3 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). Even before Miranda,
silence in the face of accusation was generally considered not sufficiently probative to
be an "admission" unless certain stringent criteria were met. See Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HAIv. L. REV. 935, 1036-44 (1966); Note, Tacit
Criminal Admissions 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210 (1963); 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1964).
63 422 U.S. at 175 n.4.
64 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, at § 821 n.3. See also C. McCoRuIcK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 161 (2d ed. 1972), in which McCormick asserted that the Court's pronounce-
ment in the Miranda dictum
leaves little doubt that silence or a claim of the privilege made in response to a
police accusation during custodial interrogation is inadmissible ...
For a discussion of the effect of Miranda on tacit criminal admissions, see 52 CORNELL L.Q.
335 (1967); 36 TENN. L. REV. 566 (1969); Note, The Miranda Decision and its Effects on
the Tacit Admissions Rule in Pennsylvania, 28 U. Prrr. L. REV. 77 (1966). See 3 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 821 n.3. (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) for a listing of recent state
cases which have considered the effect of Miranda on tacit admissions.
65 Though this issue has never been before the Supreme Court, lower federal courts
have uniformly held that a defendant's silence during police custody and interrogation
cannot be admitted on the question of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599
(4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Kroslack, 426 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Nolan, 411 F.2d 588 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); United States ex rel. Smith v. Brierly, 384 F.2d
992 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967); Helton v.
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demonstrate an awareness of the bearing which this uniform disal-
lowance of silence in the case-in-chief had on the impeachment issue.
Rather, the Hale Court relied on Wigmore's dated doctrines regarding
silence to advance the web-encrusted theory that "in most circumstances,
silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force."6 6  The
Court's failure to relate this vague pronouncement to the narrow
parameters of impeachment use of silence indicates a further inade-
quacy in its approach to the issue in Hale. By picking and choosing
convenient passages from Wigmore, reiterated without further reflec-
tion or analysis, the Court obscured the issue before it and foreclosed
the possibility of undertaking a treatment which would have proved in-
structive to the lower courts.
2. The Plight of the Arrestee
Though the Court failed to entirely treat the issue before it in Hale,
the majority opinion demonstrated its sensitivity to the various factors
which may well influence a particular arrestee to remain silent. The
Court adopted Judge Traynor's observation that arrest and interrogation
may be so intimidating whether the accused is innocent or guilty, that his
silence may be motivated more by fear than anything else.68  For
example, the Court noted that a suspect may not comprehend the ques-
tions asked him; may not be aware that certain questions require an
answer;6 9 may remain silent out of fear of incriminating others; or may
be so disoriented by the hostile and unfamiliar circumstances in which
he finds himself that he becomes averse to volunteering any informa-
tion, or answering any questions. 70  In short, the Court recognized that
a truly accurate inquiry into the actual motive for silence at arrest
may be fraught with speculation of the most subjective nature in which
the peculiarities of the individual defendant must be acknowledged as
having direct bearing on his decision to speak out or to remain silent.
United States, 221 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. LoBiondo, 135 F.2d 130 (2d
Cir. 1943). The courts which confronted this issue after 1965 relied specifically on
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See notes 138-160 infra and accompanying
discussion in text.
66 422 U.S. at 176.
6 Id. at 176-77.
1 Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33
U. Cm. L. REV. 657, 676 (1966). Published just before the Court's opinion in Miranda
was handed down, Traynor's remarks heralded Miranda's footnoted prohibition against
prosecutorial use of pre-trial silence at trial:
[The defendant] could be readily protected at the trial from such inferences by a
rule precluding the prosecution from interpreting silence in the face of police
accusation as an adoptive admission .... I would hence welcome a rule that
would protect silence at the pretrial stage from invidious interpretation at the
trial.
Id.
69 422 U.S. at 177.
70 Id.
71 Relevant to these observations about the possible motives of an accused for re-
maining silent, other than feelings of guilt, are the comments of Judge Musmanno:
Who determines whether a statement is one which "naturally" calls for a
denial? What is natural for one person may not be natural for another. There
[Vol. 25:261
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Consideration of the factors that may influence an accused to re-
main silent when arrested led the Hale Court to draw a distinction
between the situation of an arrestee who remained silent and that of a
defendant who declined to testify at his first trial and later took the
stand at a second trial for the same offense and offered exculpatory
testimony. The decision of the Court in Raffel v. United States72
contained various pronouncements concerning a defendant's waiver of his
prior immunity once he takes the stand,73 and would seem to indicate
that Hale-type impeachment is permissible. 74  The Hale Court was
quick to declare however, that Raffel did not control the instant case. 75
Raffel dealt with a choice not to testify at a prior trial, and the prior
silence in Raffel resulted from a decision made with the aid of counsel;
in contrast, the arrestee's silence in Hale might have been due to any
number of subjective factors, many of which involve an element of
compulsion. 76  The Hale Court's finding that Raffel was not control-
are persons possessed of such dignity and pride that they would treat with silent
contempt a dishonest accusation. Are they to be punished for refusing to dig-
nify with a denial what they regard as wholly false and reprehensible?
Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 585, 227 A.2d 904, 906 (1967). In Dravecz, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly overruled the precedent contained in Common-
wealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943), which held as admissible evidence
that the accused remained silent in the face of accusation after arrest.
72 271 U.S. 494 (1926). The defendant was indicted and tried twice on charges of
conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. At the first trial, a government
agent testified that after he had searched the premises of a drinking place, Raffel had
admitted that he owned it. Raffel did not take the stand in his own behalf, and the
jury failed to reach a verdict. At the second trial, the agent offered the same testimony,
and Raffel took the stand to deny that he made such a statement. The presiding judge,
over the objection of defense counsel, then elicited by questioning Raffel the fact that he
had not testified at his first trial:
Q. Did you go on the stand and contradict anything that was said?
A. I did not.
Q. Why didn't you?
A. I did not see enough evidence to convict me.
The second trial resulted in Raffel's conviction. On certification of whether it was error
to compel Raffel to disclose why he had not taken the stand in the first trial, the Supreme
Court decided it was not error.
73 271 U.S. at 497:
His waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may
not resume it at will whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or em-
barrassing.
Id. For an application of this argument to the situation of a defendant who takes the
stand and is sought to be impeached by his prior silence, see United States v. Anderson,
498 F.2d 1038, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), a!f'd sub nom. United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1069 (10th
Cir.) (Breitenstein, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
71 271 U.S. at 499. The Raffel Court concluded:
The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not
wish to become witnesses in their own behalf, and not for those who do ....
We can discern nothing in the policy of the law against self-incrimination which
would require the extension of immunity to any trial, or to any tribunal, other
than that in which the defendant preserves it by refusing to testify.
Id.
75 422 U.S. at 175.
76 The Hale Court further asserted that
the inherent pressures of in-custody interrogation exceed those of questioning be-
fore a grand jury and compound the difficulty of identifying the reason for
silence.
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ling seems sensible, especially in light of the due process considera-
tions regarding the arrest situation which have been put forth in other
decisions of the Supreme Court since Raffel was decided in 1926. 7
3. Grunewald v. United States Followed:
From the Grand Jury to the Stationhouse
The Court in Hale found a viable parallel between the circumstances
of the instant case and the situation which had been before the Court
in Grunewald v. United States.78 In Grunewald, Halperin, a witness
before a grand jury, declined to answer a series of questions on the
ground that the answers might tend to incriminate him. He was later
indicted, and took the stand at his trial in a federal court, responding
to the same questions formerly put to him by the grand jury in a manner
consistent with innocence. On cross-examination, the prosecutor at-
tempted to impeach Halperin by eliciting testimony from him con-
cerning his earlier invocation of the fifth amendment privilege on the
same subject matter.7 9 The trial court allowed this method of impeach-
ment, Halperin was convicted, and his subsequent appeal reached the
Supreme Court. The Court perceived the use of the defendant's prior
silence as an evidentiary question and concluded that he had good
reasons, other than culpability, for not speaking. 0 The Court ruled
that the defendant's prior silence was not inconsistent with his later
422 U.S. at 177. Presumably the pressures of trial are also exceeded by the pressures
of in-custody interrogation, a fact which is borne out by the Hale Court's discussion of
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 191 (1957). See notes 84-92 infra and ac-
companying discussion in text.
77 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Massiab v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
78 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
79 Id. at 391.
8o Id. at 422. The Grunewald Court extensively investigated the particular circum-
stances of the defendant before finally determining that the use of his prior silence to im-
peach him was impermissible. The Court reasoned that, in order for the defendant Hal-
perin's silence to be used to impeach him, the silence itself must be determined to be
inconsistent with the defendant's later trial testimony. The Grunewald Court cautioned
against reading Raffel to mean that such a preliminary inquiry on the inconsistency of
silence was unnecessary, since the Court in Raffel was concerned with a rather narrow is-
sue which did not apply to the situation before the Court in Grunewald. The question
certified to the Supreme Court in Raffel follows:
Was it error to require the defendant, Raffel, offering himself as a witness upon
the second trial, to disclose that he had not testified as a witness in his own behalf
upon the first trial.
271 U.S. at 496.
The defendant Halperin exercised his privilege before the grand jury, to avoid an-
swering whether he knew Grunewald. The Court noted that a lack of response was in
fact consistent with his later testimony at trial that his association with Grunewald was
in no way tainted by criminal activity. 353 U.S. at 422. The Court reasoned that, if
Halperin had divulged the fact that he knew Grunewald, he would have proffered infor-
mation which could conceivably have been used to link him to a criminal conspiracy
even though his friendship with Grunewald, as he later testified at trial, was devoid of
such contacts. This statement by the Court indicated the liberal spirit with which the
Court had traditionally interpreted fifth amendment protection.
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testimony to a degree which would justify its admission into evidence
as a prior inconsistent statement.8'
The Grunewald Court examined three factors relating to Halperin's
claim of privilege before determining that there was no inconsistency
between his silence before the grand jury and his trial testimony.
Briefly, these factors were: (1) repeated insistence of innocence before
the grand jury, (2) the invocation of the privilege in a tribunal in which
the procedural safeguards available to the claimant were less than those
ensured by a hearing in court,8 2 and (3) the degree to which the
witness was being considered a potential defendant at the time of the
questioning during which the privilege was invoked. The Court found
each of these factors present in Halperin's situation, and concluded
that his silence before the grand jury could not be used to impeach
his later exculpatory testimony because it lacked probative value on the
issue of his credibility s
These considerations were adopted by the Hale Court as the basis
of its analysis of the evidentiary value of Hale's silence.84  An applica-
tion of the Grunewald test to the facts of Hale indicates that there were
even more reasons to exclude evidence of Hale's silence under the
policies voiced in Grunewald, than there were to exclude the evidence
of Halperin's silence. First, the defendant Halperin insisted he was
innocent before a grand jury, and pleaded his fifth amendment privilege
on the advice of counsel. 85  The defendant in Hale did not have
counsel present when he chose to remain silent, and invoked the
privilege in the stationhouse immediately after being apprehended by
police.
81 353 U.S. at 423. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Warren, who concurred
jointly in the judgment in Grunewald, did not agree that the Grunewald holding should
be limited to the facts of the case, but instead expressed a strong conviction that the
constitutional issue should be directly approached, and any comment which would penalize
the privilege, including that allowed in Raffel, should be prohibited:
I can think of no special circumstances that would justify use of a constitu-
tional privilege to discredit or convict a person who asserts it. The value of con-
stitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying
on them. It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible for courts which
exist and act only under the Constitution to draw inferences of lack of honesty
from invocation of a privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement in the Constitu-
tion.
Id. at 425-26 (Black, J., concurring). The juxtaposition of a concurrence urging decision
on constitutional grounds against a majority opinion that treats the issue on a purely evi-
dentiary basis is identical to the tension between the Hale majority opinion and Justices
Douglas and Black's separate concurrences that stress the crucial constitutional issues by-
passed by the majority. See notes 123-25 infra and accompanying text. See also note
152 infra.
82 The Grunewald Court referred to E. GRISwOLD, THE FIFr- AMENDMENT TODAY (1955),
to support some of its observations about the fifth amendment privilege. Griswold's
following remarks heralded the reasoning of the Court in Grunewald:
At the very least I suggest to you again that (1) the nature of the question asked,
and (2) the nature of the tribunal, are matters which merit very careful con-
sideration in evaluating a claim of privilege.
Id. at 68.
s 353 U.S. at 424.
84 422 U.S. at 178-79.
85 353 U.S. at 422.
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Second, Halperin was a compelled and not a voluntary witness. He
could summon no witnesses himself, could not cross-examine those
witnesses testifying against him, and was not represented by counsel
during the actual grand jury questioning.86 These factors indicate that
a person questioned by a grand jury does not have the procedural safe-
guards and opportunity available to a defendant at trial, and thus has
a better reason to invoke the privilege in response to questioning. The
Hale Court pointed out that an arrestee is in an even less advantageous
position than a witness before a grand jury, since Hale "in addition
lacked such minimal safeguards as the presence of public arbiters and
a reporter which were present in Grunewald."87
The third point, and the one deemed most significant by the
Grunewald Court, regarded the focus on Halperin during the grand
jury questioning as a possible future defendant. The Grunewald Court
considered that, in this regard, Halperin's silence could not rightly be
regarded as inconsistent with his later testimony at trial because "it
was quite natural for him to fear that he was being asked questions
for the very purpose of providing evidence against himself."8  The
Hale Court stated that Hale at the time of arrest wvas even more clearly
a potential defendant than Halperin, since he "had been the subject of
eyewitness identification and had been arrested on suspicion of having
committed the offense."8' 9
The logical conclusion that can be drawn from the Court's reasoning
in Hale and Grunewald is that a finding of these three factors will
indicate conclusively to the Court that the defendant's silence was
motivated by considerations other than concealment of guilt or tacit
assent to the accusations made against him.90 Conversely, the Court
implied in both opinions that, if these three factors could not be es-
tablished, there may be greater reason to believe that the defendant's
prior silence had probative value. Both the Hale Court and the Grune-
wald Court agreed, however, that the dangers of allowing cross-
examination to elicit the fact of the defendant's silence were so great,
that the cross-examination should not be allowed unless its probative
value outweighed the prejudicial impact it would have on the de-
fendant's case.9 Neither Court had to undertake such a balancing of
Id.
17 422 U.S. at 179. Chief Justice Burger, however did not believe that the nature of
the tribunal and the presence or absence of the procedural safeguards available to one
who invoked the privilege should have any bearing on the probative value to be assigned
to silence, and in fact considered this aspect of the Grunewald opinion a "fallacy."
Id. at 181 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
353 U.S. at 42,3.
s 422 U.S. at 179.
10 The consideration voiced by the Grunewald test would seem to clearly preclude
Raffel from controlling in the situations of silence during grand jury questioning or
post-arrest custodial interrogation. Raffel asserted his privilege during an open trial,
presumably on the advice of counsel, with the truth-testing procedures of summoning
witnesses and cross-examination available to him.
"' 422 U.S. at 180; 353 U.S. at 420. See FED. R. Evio. 403, which provides in
relevant part:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
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the probative value and the potential prejudice, since both Courts
found that the silence was not inconsistent with the trial testimony and
thus not at all probative on the issue of the defendant's credibility.
92
4. The "Hale Test"
The above discussion of the Hale and Grunewald cases focused on
their similarities. The reasoning of the Hale Court, however, was some-
what less lucid than the reasoning contained in the Grunewald majority
opinion. A close reading of Hale produces some doubt about the pre-
cise function of the tripartite "Grunewald test" in the Hale majority
opinion. A look at the record reveals that the defendant Hale (1) made
no assertion inconsistent with innocence in the proceeding against him,
(2) remained silent when questioned at the police station without the
assistance of counsel, and (3) had good reason to believe, since he was
given the Miranda warnings, that he was being questioned for the pur-
pose of incriminating himself. If the issue of impeachment by use of
the arrestee's silence was indeed so thoroughly and obviously controlled
by the dictates of Grunewald, there would seem to have been little
need for the Court to write an opinion simply to demonstrate the ap-
plicability of Grunewald. There is some indication, therefore, that the
Court in Hale undertook to do more than merely echo Grunewald.
In Hale, the government argued that Hale's silence at the time of his
arrest was probative of the falsity of the explanation he later offered
at trial. The government contended Hale's silence was probative be-
cause an innocent man, finding himself in Hale's situation, would have
been prompted to explain away the incriminating circumstances by the
incentive of immediate release and the opportunity for independent cor-
roboration.9 3  Faced with the government's argument, the Hale Court
examined the circumstances of Hale's arrest and found three factors,
in addition to those already enumerated in Grunewald, which indicated
Hale had good reason to remain silent when arrested: (1) he was aware
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury ....
This rule provides two grounds - unfair prejudice and misleading the jury - for the
exclusion of the silence at issue in Hale. This rule was heralded in the Court's statement
in Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933): "When the risk of confusion is so
great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out." Id. at 104, quoted in
422 U.S. at 180.
52 The Hale Court further dismissed any notion that the determination of the pro-
bative value of the defendant's silence may be properly within the province of the jury
as finders of fact:
[p]ermitting the defendant to explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to
overcome the strong negative inference that the jury is likely to draw from the
fact that the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest.
422 U.S. at 180. See also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957). But
cf. Brief for Petitioner at 12-26, United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), in which the
government contended that the defendant could offset any negative inferences drawn by the
jury from evidence of his prior silence by being allowed to explain them away. This posi-
tion has found little, if any, support since Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See
notes 138-60 infra and accompanying discussion in text.
13 422 U.S. at 179. Hale's explanation was corroborated by his estranged wife at
trial. 498 F.2d at 1040.
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that there was strong evidence against him (a positive eyewitness identi-
fication, his flight from police, and his possession of $158 in cash),
(2) he had prior contacts with the police, and (3) he was participating,
at the time of his arrest, in a narcotics rehabilitation program.94
The consideration of these three additional facts formed the basis
for the Hale Court's response to the government's argument:
In these circumstances [Hale] could not have expected the police
to release him merely on the strength of his explanation ...
[i]n light of the many alternative explanations for his pretrial
silence, we do not think it sufficiently probative of an inconsis-
tency with his in-court testimony to warrant admission of evi-
dence thereof. 95
This alternative explanation requirement - the "Hale test" - de-
mands an inquiry into the motive for the accused's silence in order to
fully examine the probability that a defendant had good reasons to
remain silent. 96 The adequacy of such a test, however, is highly ques-
tionable. In setting this type of precedent, the Hale Court may have
been encouraging trial judges in federal courts to undertake an inquiry
into the motives of the accused on a case by case basis. On the other
hand, the Grunewald test may have been the only inquiry mandated by
the Court in Hale, with the buttressing of that test with further inquiry
into possible alternative explanations left to the discretion of the trial
judge. In addition, Hale may have implied that first offenders have less
of a reason for remaining silent than those with a prior police record.
The possible interpretations of the Court's reasoning in Hale have
been rendered inconsequential by the Court's decision in Doyle v.
Ohio. But, had courts been forced to look only to Hale for guidance,
it is probable that they would have allowed a prosecutor to impeach a
defendant by his prior silence in certain situations, even though the
defendant met the requisites of the Grunewald test.9 7
94 Id.
95 422 U.S. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
16 422 U.S. at 177. One authoritative commentator has suggested that "inquiry into
the motive of silence ... is so difficult that no accurate results can be expected."
C. McCopMncK, LAW OF EvmErcE § 161 (2d ed. 1972).
Compare the rationale of Justice Warren in Miranda regarding the importance of avoid-
ing speculation about an accused's state of mind at the time of arrest:
[The Court] will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant
was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the
knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, edu-
cation, intelligence, or prior contacts with authorities, can never be more than
speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.
384 U.S. at 468-69 (citation omitted).
V The language of Hale may be interpreted as expressing the desire of the Court to
limit its holding to the facts of Hale. 422 U.S. at 179. See Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957) for a similar utterance by the Court which evidently has not
restricted its precedential value. But see, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d
1038, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1974), (Wilkey, J., dissenting) aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
See 13 AM. CraM. L. REv. 263, 269 (1975) for a prognostication of the practical
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LMTATONS ON
IMPEAcHmErrr BY SILENCE
The Supreme Court proved to be its own worst critic regarding the
inadequacy of its holding in Hale. The Court concluded that Hale
did not adequately resolve the judicial controversy concerning the
use of silence for impeachment purposes"8 and, therefore, granted
certiorari to the joined cases of Doyle v. Ohio and Wood v. Ohio°9 to
determine the constitutional parameters of impeachment by silence.
The crucial facts of Doyle, unlike those of Hale, were disputed.
The State claimed that narcotic agents observed defendants Doyle and
Wood sell ten pounds of marijuana to a police informant. 10 0 In con-
trast, the defendants contended that the informant had proposed that
they sell him the marijuana; the defendants claimed that when this
endeavor was frustrated by their indecision over the volume to be pur-
chased, the informant attempted to "frame" them by throwing a
packet of $1,320 in marked bills into their car and driving away with the
marijuana.' 0' The defendants neither offered this explanation to the
narcotic agents upon their arrest, which shortly followed the disputed
transaction, nor did they advance this story during the preliminary
hearing.10 2
The defendants' version of the transaction presented a formidable
obstacle for the prosecution. The defense counsel's cross-examination
of the narcotic agents who had observed the transaction revealed that
the agents had a restricted view of the site of the alleged sale and that
it was questionable whether the defendants had actually passed the
package of marijuana to the informant.l °  The prosecution attempted
to discredit the "frame-up" explanation by trying to impeach the de-
fendants' testimony through extensive cross-examination. This cross-
examination included interrogation regarding the defendant's failure
to tell the frame-up story to the narcotic agents at the time of arrest. 0 4
impact of Hale on the federal courts prior to the holding of the Court in Doyle v. Ohio,
96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
98 Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244 (1976).
99 The defendants Doyle and Wood were tried separately and convicted of the sale of
marijuana in Common Pleas Court, Tuscawaras County, Ohio. State v. Doyle, Case
No. 10656 (Oct. 16, 1973); State v. Wood, Case No. 10657 (Oct. 29, 1973). Each was a
witness at the other's trial, and each was impeached as a witness by his silence at the
time of the other's arrest. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari to the subsidiary
question of whether or not such impeachment of a witness was permissible, 96 S. Ct. 36
(1975), but did not find the resolution of this question necessary to decide Doyle. 96 S. Ct.
at 2244 n.6.
100 96 S. Ct. at 2242.
10 Id.
102 The cross-examination of the defendants in both trials included questioning by the
prosecutor concerning their failure to tell the "frame-up" story in the preliminary hearing.
Although the Court granted certiorari to this question, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975), it did not
reach consideration of this issue in the Doyle case. 96 S. Ct. at 2244 n.6.
103 96 S. Ct. at 2242.
104 In the first trial, that of defendant Wood, the following exchange occurred between
prosecutor and defendant:
Q. [prosecutor] Mr. Beamer [arresting narcotics agent] did arrive on the scene?
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Moreover, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to emphasize the fact
of the defendants' post-arrest silence in his closing argument to the
jury.10 5 Defense counsel made timely objections to the prosecution's
references to the defendants' post-arrest silence, but these objections
were overruled, 06 and the defendants were convicted.
The defendants appealed their convictions, alleging reversible error
in allowing the use of post-arrest silence to impeach their testimony.
The court of appeals found no error in the proceedings below and, in
separate unreported opinions, affirmed the convictions. 0 7 The court of
appeals did not consider constitutional error in their treatment of the
petition for appeal, and concluded that the cross-examination was ap-
propriate 0
A. The Doyle Majority Opinion
Careful examination of the Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Doyle reveals a heavy reliance on the Hale Court's observations on the
impropriety of impeachment by silence. The Hale holding was of
limited effect, binding only on the federal courts, 109 and could, ar-
A. [Wood] Yes, he did.
Q. And I assume you told him all about what happened to you?
A. No.
Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer?
A. No.
Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer this guy put $1,300 in your car?
A. No sir.
Q. And we can't understand any reason why anyone would put money in your
car and you were chasing him around town and trying to give it back?
A. I didn't understand that.
Q. You mean you didn't tell him that?
A. Tell him what?
Q. But in any event you didn't bother to tell Mr. Beamer anything about this?
A. No sir.
Transcript of Wood Trial 465-70, quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2243. This exchange was sub-
stantially duplicated in Doyle's trial. Transcript of Doyle Trial 504-07, quoted in 96
S. Ct. at 2243 n.5.
105 See Supplemental Transcript of Wood Trial 11, 13, quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2252 n.
12; Transcript of Doyle Trial 515, 526, quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2252 n.12.
106 96 S. Ct. at 2243.
107 State v. Doyle, Case No. 1108 (Ohio App., 5th Dist., Jan. 6, 1975); State v. Wood,
Case No. 1109 (Ohio App., 5th Dist., Jan. 6, 1975).
108 The court of appeals succinctly stated its reasoning:
This was not evidence offered by the state in its case in chief as confession by si-
lence or as substantive evidence of guilt but rather cross-examination of a witness
as to why he had not told the same story earlier at his first opportunity.
We find no error in this. It goes to credibility of the witness.
Memorandum of the Court of Appeals, Fifth District, Tuscarawas County, quoted in 96
S. Ct. at 2243. Defendants were denied leave to appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals
judgment by the Ohio Supreme Court. State v. Doyle, Case No. 75-177 (May 9, 1975);
State v. Wood, Case No. 75-177 (April 25, 1975).
1'9 Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244 n.8 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.
171, 181 (1975).
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guably, be further restricted in its application to the facts of that par-
ticular case." 0 The primary significance of the Doyle opinion is that
it effectively imposed a per se exclusionary rule on the use of an ar-
restee's silence to impeach his testimony, a rule which does not depend
upon the particular circumstances of the case."' Because the Doyle
holding sought to eliminate potential due process violations, it is bind-
ing on federal courts through the fifth amendment due process clause,
and on state courts through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment." 1 2
Those federal and state courts which previously permitted impeach-
ment by the use of prior silence uniformly buttressed their holdings
with the dictates of Harris v. New York." 3  In Harris, the Court held
that when statements were obtained from a defendant in contravention
of Miranda warnings, those statements could be used to impeach his
testimony although inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
In contrast to the Hale Court's failure to address the Harris decision," 4
the Doyle Court specifically limited the applicability of that decision
to its facts through a declaration that Miranda imposed an insur-
mountable barrier to allowing impeachment by silence." 5  Thus, in-
stead of following Harris, the Doyle Court accepted the Hale findings
concerning the ambiguities inherent in post-arrest silence and held that
the use of such silence constituted a per se violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." 6
1. Doyle and the Hale Evaluation of Silence
The Court in Hale attempted to determine the probative value of
post-arrest silence when used to impeach a defendant's testimony.
While the Hale Court recognized that the administration of the Miranda
warnings to a defendant could affect his decision to remain silent, it
did not conclude that, in all cases, post-arrest silence was necessarily
110 See note 97 supra.
M 96 S. Ct. at 2245. The only exception to the per se rule, which prohibits im-
peachment by post-arrest silence as violative of due process, was noted by the majority
and by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion:
The fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a
defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have
told the police the same version upon arrest.
96 S. Ct. at 2245 n.ll, quoted at 96 S. Ct. at 2246 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). How-
ever, the majority made a crucial distinction regarding this situation which was over-
looked by Justice Stevens: the silence here would not be used specifically to impeach
the defendant's credibility regarding his exculpatory version of events; rather, it would
be used to refute the defendant's explanation of his conduct after he was arrested. Id.
at 2245 n.il.
112 Since the due process constitutionality of a state court proceeding was at issue
in Doyle, the relevant section of the Constitution would be the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which contains language identical to the fifth amendment due
process clause.
113 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See note 35 supra.
'14 This refusal constituted a major failing of the Hale decision. See note 38 supra.
15 96 S. Ct. at 2245.
16 Id.
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or directly attributable to a defendant's knowledge of his right to re-
main silent. Justice Marshall, writing the majority opinion, observed
that in the situation where the Miranda warnings preceded the silence
in question, the defendant's
failure to offer an explanation during the custodial interrogation
can as easily be taken to indicate reliance on the right to remain
silent as to support an inference that the explanatory testimony
was a later fabrication. There is simply nothing to indicate which
interpretation is more probably correct. 117
Thus, the Hale Court alluded to the inherent ambiguities of post-arrest
silence but failed to follow the implications of this finding to their
logical conclusion: that these ambiguities prevent the use of such silence
to impeach a defendant's testimony.
The Court in Doyle reached its conclusion by integrating the Miranda
and Hale decisions. The Doyle Court felt that because the com-
pulsory Miranda warnings inform a person that he has the constitutional
right to remain silent, and the silence which follows those warnings
may constitute no more than an exercise of defendant's rights, all post-
arrdst silence is insolubly ambiguous.1 " The Doyle Court thus de-
picted the silence following Miranda warnings as both "insolubly am-
biguous" and "inherently ambiguous" as a result of those warnings. 119
The Doyle majority utilized this depiction to support its holding that
the use of post-arrest silence to impeach is "fundamentally unfair and
a deprivation of due process."' 20  The Doyle Court's lack of analysis
in reaching this conclusion did not ostensibly undermine its holding,
since the Court had supplied the groundwork requisite for this con-
clusion in Hale. In Hale the Court simply failed, for whatever reason,
to make this constitutional determination.12'
2. Justice White's Hale Concurrence: "Basic Fairness"
A close reading of the language of Doyle reveals that two considera-
tions mandated the holding of the Court. The first consideration, pre-
viously discussed, was the insoluble ambiguity of post-arrest silence. 22
The second consideration entailed an evaluation of what a reasonable
"17 422 U.S. at 177. It is interesting to note that the First Circuit in Fagundes v.
United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965), when faced with the issue before the Hale
Court, used the same language to indicate the ambiguity of silence at arrest:
Fagundes' words when arrested can as well be taken as indicating reliance upon
constitutional rights as supporting an inference that his alibi was an afterthought.
There is nothing to indicate which interpretation is more probable.
Id. at 677. However, the Fagundes court concluded from this statement that impeach-
ment by use of prior silence is a fortiori not justifiable, whereas the Hale Court uses
the same rationale as an introduction to its analysis of the probative value of silence.
M 96 S. Ct. at 2244.
19 Id.
121 Id. at 2245.
121 The Hale Court acknowledged its avoidance of the constitutional question under-
lying the issue in that case. 422 U.S. at 173.
122 See notes 118-21 supra and accompanying text.
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person would infer if given Miranda warnings in an arrest situation;
more specifically, the Miranda warnings inform a reasonable person of
his right to remain silent and, therefore, implicitly assure that person
his silence will not be used to incriminate him.12 3 The Doyle majority
deferred to Justice White's Hale concurrence in which he stated that
due process precluded the use of post-arrest silence to impeach a de-
fendant who has been told that he may remain silent at the time of ar-
rest. 24  The fact that Justice White's concurrence was reprinted in
Doyle in its substantial entirety indicates not only the conciseness of that
Justice's style but also his effective disposition of the issue before the
Hale Court.
Justice White's finding that the Miranda warning implicitly assures
a defendant that his silence will not be used against him is convincing.
1 2 5
Though Justice White is not a strong supporter of Miranda and, in fact,
dissented from the majority opinion in that case, his attempt to
parallel the administration of justice with the inferences drawn from
the warning demonstrates a laudable exercise of judicial dispassion.
3. The Return to the Miranda Dictum:
A Decade of Wandering
We shall not cease from exploration
and the end of all our exploring
will be to arrive where we started
and know the place for the first time.
26
The "insolubly ambiguous" theory and the "implicit assurance"
doctrine - the legal methods employed by the Doyle Court to resolve
the issue before it - are not explicitly derived from statutory law,
common law, or developing case law, but have their roots in basic
common sense. Such derivation may account for the brevity of the
Court's statement in Doyle: given the Miranda decision and the Hale
123 96 S. Ct. at 2245.
124 Id., quoting in part 422 U.S. at 182-83:
Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be
used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Mi-
randa warnings that this would not be the case.
125 Justice White's approach is backed by the reasoning of the Court in Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943). Johnson contained some potent language regarding
the importance of informing an accused of the consequences of exercising the fifth
amendment privilege. One of the issues before the Court in Johnson was whether it was
proper for the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's exercise of his fifth amend-
ment privilege during cross-examination in order to avoid responding to certain questions.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, noted that one problem with this type of comment
was that in order for an accused to make an intelligent choice whether he should exer-
cise the privilege, he should know beforehand whether evidence of his failure to testify
would be submitted to the jury. Id. at 198. The Court suggested that "[i]f the accused
makes the choice without that knowledge, he may well be misled on one of the most im-
portant decisions in his defense." Id. at 198-99. This reasoning clearly applies to the ex-
ercise of the privilege to remain silent at the time of arrest. The Hale Court acknowl-
edged its applicability in the same breath in which it disclaimed the constitutional issue.
422 U.S. at 175 n.4. The Court in Doyle found the situation in Johnson analogous to the
facts before it. 96 S. Ct. at 2245 n.8.
121 T. S. EuOr, THE COMPL'rE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950, at 145 (1952).
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analysis of the probative value of silence, the conclusions advanced in
Doyle appear inescapable. In effect, Doyle afforded the force of law to
the Miranda dictum, which had anticipated the problems correspondent
to the use of silence after Miranda:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution
may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or
claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
12 7
Arguably, the entire Hale - Doyle controversy could have been
avoided had the Miranda Court emphatically stated that the use at
trial of a defendant's post-arrest silence to imply guilt would not com-
port with the constitutional right to due process under the law. Instead,
the Court had merely deemed such usage impermissible.128 Perhaps the
reason the due process implications were not emphasized by the Miranda
Court was that the Court viewed them as obvious.
B. The Paths Not Taken
1. Alternatives to the Exclusion of Silence
The Doyle Court, in finding that impeachment use of post-arrest
silence was a violation of due process, did not endeavor to suggest ways
in which an accused could be advised that although he has the right to
remain silent, a negative inference may be drawn from his silence at
trial. If an accused were so informed, it would seem that the "im-
plicit assurance" rationale would no longer be germane to the im-
peachment issue since the accused would be given notice that his
silence could be used to his detriment.
Two alternatives to the present method of informing an accused of
his fifth amendment rights have been proposed. The first of these
suggested procedures is to bring an accused before a magistrate im-
mediately after arrest and inform him that he has the right to speak or
remain silent, but if he remains silent and is subsequently charged, his
refusal to speak will be disclosed at trial.2 9  The advantage of this
plan is that it eliminates police interrogation and the concomitant
coercive techniques, giving the accused an impartial forum in which to
explain the circumstances of his arrest. The disadvantage is that there
may exist some compulsion on the defendant to incriminate himself
due to the "threat" of the magistrate to disclose the defendant's refusal
127 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
I' While the mere substitution of these words would not have given the Miranda
dictum the force of law, they would have helped to remove the ambiguity that fostered
Varying interpretations of that decision, and which aggravated conflicts in the courts of ap-
peals concerning the use of silence for impeachment. See Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240,
2244 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 173 n.2 (1975).
129 See W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPEcr AND SocrErY 60, 63-71, 80 (1967); Friendly,
The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L.
REV. 671, 712-16 (1968); Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - Remedy for the
Third Degree, 30 Micn. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
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to answer at a subsequent trial. The fact that one of the main drawbacks
to such an extensive reform of the criminal justice system is the pos-
sibility of disclosure of silence at trial demonstrates the crucial nature of
the issue in Hale and Doyle.130
The second of these proposals involves a rewriting of the Miranda
warning. If a defendant is to be subjected to impeachment by evi-
dence of his post-arrest silence, due process would seem to dictate that
the Miranda warnings be revised to express this possibility.13 ' The
revised portion of the Miranda warning might read as follows: "You
have the right to remain silent, and anything you say could be used
against you. If you choose to remain silent, and testify in your own
defense at trial, you may be discredited by the fact that you remained
silent." There would be many difficulties inherent in such a revised
warning. It has been suggested by at least one commentator that due
to the haphazard way in which the Miranda warnings are presently
administered by the police, such a revision would only increase the
confusion of an arrestee1 32  To fully grasp its implications, he would
have to be charged with knowledge of the function of impeachment in
a jury trial. He would also be compelled to make "one of the most
important decisions of his defense"'133 in this state of confusion without
the advice of counsel. At the police station, the most urgent thought
running through the accused's mind is likely to be, "How do I get out
of this mess and avoid looking guilty?"' 3 4  Police officers are well
aware of this, and may try to use this desire of the accused to their
advantage by reading the revised warning in such a way that the ac-
cused interprets it to mean, "You might as well confess, because you
110 For a full discussion of the Kauper-Schaefer- Friendly plan, see Kamisar, Kauper's
"Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later - Some Comments on a Re-
narkable Article, 73 MicH. L. REV. 15 (1974). This article was cited by the Hale Court
in their discussion of the plight of the arrestee. 422 U.S. at 177 n.5.
131 The need for such a revised warning in these circumstances was voiced half a cen-
tury ago in McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928). The court declared
that if the accused's silence was to be used against him, he should be warned: "If you
say anything, it will be used against you; if you do not say anything, that will be used
against you." Id. at 299. Several federal courts of appeals suggested that such a revised
warning was necessary if the accused's silence was to be used to impeach him at trial.
See United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.
1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Kamisar, supra
note 130, at 34 n.70.
132 Kamisar, supra note 130, at 34 n.70. Kamisar refers to various studies of the actual
implementation of the Miranda warnings which indicate that
a large number of police officers do not give the silence or counsel warnings at
all, and many who do, do not give them in a meaningful way; moreover, a signifi-
cant percentage of suspects either misunderstand the existing warnings or fail to
appreciate their significance. . . . In this light, how can anyone seriously suggest
that we make the Miranda warnings significantly more complicated, yet con-
tinue to rely on the uncorroborated oral testimony of the police officer to establish
the legality of the questioning?
Id.
133 318 U.S. at 199.
"I Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 645, 654 (1967).
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are going to look really bad if you don't." In this instance, the exercise
of the right to remain silent at the time of arrest would become so
burdened by fear of recrimination that remaining silent might lose
whatever effectiveness it had as a check to the pressures inherent in
the police investigative process so thoroughly delineated in Miranda.
3 5
In fact this type of badgering is exactly the type of evil sought to be
eliminated by the Miranda decision.'," It is thus evident that the
administration of a revised warning would do little to insure due process
of the law to an arrestee, and could in fact lead to a resurgence of pre-
Miranda violations of an accused's fifth amendment rights.
2. The Fifth Amendment Issue
The Court in Doyle could have approached the issue before it on
grounds other than due process. Those courts of appeals that disallowed
impeachment by use of an arrestee's silence on constitutional grounds
had found support for their prohibitions in the fifth amendment's
guarantee of a defendant's right to remain silent. 3 7  This avenue was
open to the Doyle Court, but it was not taken. If the Court had ad-
dressed the fifth amendment implications, however, it would have pre-
sumably framed the issue in the following terms: Whether the fifth
amendment right to remain silent guarantees an arrestee that his post-
arrest silence will not be used to impeach his testimony at trial.
In attempting to formulate such a guarantee, several federal ap-
pellate courts sought guidance from the Supreme Court's decision in
Griffin v. California.3 1 In Griffin, the Court held that the defendant's
fifth amendment right to remain silent was fundamental to insuring
that a defendant received a fair trial. The Court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction for first-degree murder solely on the ground that
the prosecutor had commented on the defendant's failure to take the
witness stand and testify on his own behalf, 3 9 even though the jury
had previously been carefully instructed on the limited inferences they
were permitted to draw from the defendant's silence. 40  Justice Doug-
135 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
116 See 384 U.S. at 453-55 for an interesting illustration of how police, through cer-
tain practiced strategies, may psychologically manipulate an accused to forego his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.
1,7 See note 24 supra.
138 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
'3 Id. at 610-11. The following comments were offered by the prosecutor to the jury
in his closing argument:
These things he had not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.
And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know.
Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant won't.
Id. at 611.
140 The decision in Griffin was made possible by the action of the Court in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Malloy, the Court declared that "the same standards must
determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or a state proceeding is justi-
fied," id. at 11, and held that the states were prohibited by the fifth amendment from
compelling testimony from an accused. The Malloy Court accomplished this by applying
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las, writing for the Griffin majority, deplored any comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify as a "remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of
justice' which the fifth amendment outlaws,"4' implying that the right
not to incriminate oneself is fundamental to a system which presumes
innocence until guilt is proven. 4 ' Justice Douglas further decried pe-
nalizing the exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed privilege by in any
way attaching to it a presumption of guilt. Such a comment penalizes
a defendant for exercising a constitutional right and, therefore, "cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 143 Thus, Griffin
stands for the proposition that a defendant's fifth amendment right has
been abridged if the exercise of that right is allowed to be used as
evidence of the defendant's guilt.
The Court implicitly expanded the scope of Griffin to encompass
the police custodial interrogation situation in Miranda v. Arizona.' 44
Miranda held that confessions gained from suspects who had not ade-
quately been warned of the consequences of confessing and who had
not been protected from coercive investigative techniques were in-
admissible. 145  The cornerstone of the Miranda warnings is the re-
quirement that a suspect who is held for interrogation "must be first
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to re-
main silent."' 4 6  One of the reasons for this is that the defendant may
need to exercise the right to combat the inherent pressures of insistent
questioning by the police.
One of the coercive techniques outlined by the Court, is the suggestion,
overtly or subtly, to the accused that "silence in the face of accusation
is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury."' 47  The
Miranda Court responded to this suggestion in footnoted dictum, spe-
cifically curtailing the uses which can be made of an arrestee's silence
at trial:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
the fifth amendment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The refinement of the scope of the fifth amendment privilege to preclude comment
on the fact that the defendant did not take the stand at his trial, enunciated by the Court
in Griffin, was already provided for by a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970). The
Malloy decision made it possible to apply this same prohibition to the states through
Griffin.
"1 380 U.S. at 611, quoting in part Murphy v. Waterfront Comnmn'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964). In the judicial history of fifth amendment interpretation, the Court hias found
that certain kinds of treatment of individuals who declined to testify in their own behalf
are impermissible because of their effect in "compelling" a defendant to testify.
142 See E. GRiswOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 9 (1955).
143 380 U.S. at 611. This position was voiced in Justice Black's concurring opinion
in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957). See note 81 supra.
144 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 467-68.
147 Id. at 468. This statement was echoed by the Hale Court as part of its rationale for
excluding evidence of an arrestee's silence. 422 U.S. at 180.
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not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute and claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation. 148
In this context, the purpose of the Miranda dictum was to notify law
enforcement officials and courts that the holding of Miranda man-
dated that trial procedures and evidentiary rules meet a certain stan-
dard to insure that the right to silence at the time of arrest will not be
undercut later at trial.
Some federal courts of appeals have interpreted the Miranda dic-
tum as directly applicable to the impeachment situation of the type
found in Hale.149  The Tenth Circuit, in Johnson v. Patterson,50
dealt with a defendant who took the stand to offer an explanation of
his acts and was asked by the prosecution why he remained silent at
the time of arrest. The Tenth Circuit, relying on Griffin and the
Miranda dictum, affirmed the district court's reversal of Johnson's
conviction even though the defense did not object to the questioning
at trial, holding that:
Silence at the time of arrest is simply the exercise of a con-
stitutional right that all persons must enjoy without qualifica-
tion, and that violation of this right by using the defendant's
silence to his detriment at trial warranted a reversal of his con-
viction.15 1
The Tenth Circuit cannot be faulted for readily perceiving the
Miranda dictum as applicable to the situation of a defendant who has
been impeached by his silence at the time of arrest. 5 2  In order to
14 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
149 See note 24 supra.
150 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
1-51 Id. at 1068. The Johnson court was not unanimous in its decision to reverse the
conviction gained in the lower court and to grant a writ of habeas corpus to the petitioner.
Judge Breitenstein in his dissent took a different view of the working of the fifth amend-
ment in this situation, asserting that the defendant waived his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination when he took the stand to testify as Hale did, and that this
waiver somehow triggered a retroactive revocation of his Miranda right not to have his
silence at the time of arrest used against him at trial. This proposition overlooked the
fundamental consideration which motivated the Court to formulate the Miranda safeguards
- the fact that the two situations, arrest and trial, are distinctly different and each merits
a separate and independent safeguard of the individual's rights. In the situation of arrest
and police interrogation, the accused, without the assistance of counsel, could be brow-
beaten and harangued into making some kind of a confession by the elaborate police
tactics so succinctly enumerated in Miranda by the Court. The fifth amendment right at
the time of arrest is, in effect, the accused's "lone sure rock in a time of storm." See
E. GmswoID, supra note 142, at 73. At trial, however, the defendant is in a forum of jus-
tice and represented by counsel. The Hale Court noted that the defendant 11J this situa-
tion may be more amenable to aiding the court in the search for justice by supplying his
testimony. 422 U.S. at 178 n.6. Nonetheless, his fifth amendment right not to ake the
stand at trial is firmly established. See notes 128-33 supra and accompanying discussion
in text.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Breitenstein in Johnson relied on the Raffel idea of
waiver which was expressly rejected by the Hale Court. See notes 72-77 supra, and
accompanying text.
152 Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Hale took an approach similar to that
espoused by the Johnson majority. Justice Douglas argued that the cross-examination con-
cerning silence be disallowed, and suggested that the Court not limit the holding in this
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correctly formulate the self-incrimination issue latent in Hale-type im-
peachment, however, it becomes imperative to follow the lead of
Griffin in this area and determine the specific burdens imposed on the
defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment privilege by allowing him
to be impeached by his post-arrest silence.
There seem to be two types of burdens which could result from al-
lowing such impeachment. The first is a burden on the defendant's
choice to exercise his privilege, which would have the effect of making
the exercise of the privilege less desirable in the eyes of the defendant.
This "choice burden" on the exercise of the privilege would seem to
be great; an accused might very well feel compelled to waive his
privilege and incriminate himself if he knew his silence would be used
against him at trial.'5
The second burden on the fifth amendment privilege is the type of
burden pinpointed in Griffin.154  This burden occurs when the ex-
ercise of the privilege becomes evidence of guilt when brought to the
attention of the jury. This resulting burden seems potentially greater
in the Hale situation than it was in Griffin. The jury would doubtless
be aware that the defendant did not testify even if that fact were not
directly brought to their attention by the prosecutor, and would draw
an inference of guilt from their awareness of the accused's silence
even if they were instructed not to do so by the trial judge. A jury would
not be able, however, to ascertain for themselves whether the de-
fendant was silent when he was arrested, and thus would not be af-
forded the opportunity to draw the negative inference, unless the
case to the special circumstances presented. Justice Douglas quoted approvingly from
Justice Black's similar reservations in Grunewald:
... I do not, like the Court, rest my conclusion on the special circumstances of
this case. I can think of no special circumstances that would justify use of a con-
stitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person who asserts it.
353 U.S. at 425, quoted in 422 U.S. at 182. Justice Douglas saw no reason why the
Miranda dictum was not applicable to the instant case: "I do not accept the idea that
Miranda loses its force in the context of impeaching the testimony of a witness." 422 U.S.
at 182.
In a previous opinion, in which he dissented along with Justices Marshall and Brennan
from a denial of certiorari to United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973), Justice Douglas stated his opposition to impeach-
ment by use of prior silence in stronger language:
We thus seem to have come to the point where the exercise of one's constitu-
tional rights can be offered to the jury as evidence of guilt.
414 U.S. at 940.
153 See notes 129-36 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed pro-
cedures which would notify an arrestee of the possibility that the exercise of his right to
remain silent could be used against him. Realistic appraisal of the burden placed on the
defendant's choice whether to exercise his privilege is possible only if it can be assumed
that an arrestee knows at the time he makes the choice that silence may be used to his
detriment. But see C. McConMciK, LAw OF EvlmENcE § 161 (2d ed. 1972), in which it
is suggested that
if the subject's silence is admissible against him and he is aware of this, the rule of
admissibility itself arguably constitutes compulsion to respond in a potentially self-
incriminating manner.
Id. (emphasis added); cf. United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.
1973). See generally Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968).
154 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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prosecutor was allowed to bring this fact to their attention through his
cross-examination of the defendant. In this regard, it would be entirely
possible for an accused who was impeached by evidence of his prior
silence to suffer the same penalty that would occur if evidence of silence
was presented as part of the government's case-in-chief; 55 the ef-
fectiveness of instructions to the jury limiting the use of the evidence
for impeachment purposes is questionable. 156
The foregoing discussion reveals several points concerning the
fifth amendment issue. There seems to be a basis in Griffin and
Miranda from which to construe an arrestee's right to be free from
detrimental use of his post-arrest silence. Furthermore, the impeach-
ment considered in Hale and Doyle would burden the exercise of the
fifth amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. Had the
Court in Doyle undertaken a fifth amendment analysis of the issue before
it, it would no doubt have proceeded cautiously in light of the Court's
recent declaration in Michigan v. Tucker157 that the Miranda prophy-
lactic warnings currently in use to insure protection of the defendant's
fifth amendment rights are subject to alteration 5 8 and are outside the
actual scope of the procedural rights protected by the fifth amend-
ment.15 9  By opting for a due process resolution of the issue rather
than deciding the issue on fifth amendment grounds, the Court may
have purposely avoided aggravating the controversy engendered by the
much-criticized Tucker decision. 160
15 Such direct use of silence as evidence of guilt is impermissible. See note 65 supra.
156 In this context, the Ninth Circuit has poignantly observed the drawbacks in relying
on evidentiary distinctions when presenting the fact of the defendant's silence to the jury:
It is not likely that all jurors would find it psychologically possible to restrict the
application of such proof to the narrow purpose of its admission - impeachment
- notwithstanding the adequacy of jury instructions given by a careful trial judge.
Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 54 (9th Cir. 1969) (impeachment by silence at time of
arrest deemed not permissible, conviction for sale of heroin reversed).
157 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
'5 384 U.S. at 467.
159 In Tucker, the Court allowed testimony of a witness whose identity was learned
solely on the basis of a statement obtained from the defendant in violation of the guide-
lines set forth in Miranda. The Tucker Court quoted Miranda in support of its holding:
[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any par-
ticular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted.
417 U.S. at 444, quoting 384 U.S. at 467. The reasoning of the Tucker Court is somewhat
obscure on this point, and its use of Miranda here seems questionable in light of the
policy considerations voiced throughout the section of Miranda from which the above
phrase was quoted. A close reading of this section of Miranda reveals that the Miranda
warnings must be given to protect the accused's privilege of not having to incriminate
himself until better methods can be devised by Congress or the states. Thus, though the
Miranda Court did not require that the warning contain specific words or be given in a
particular form, it did mandate that some warning be given to guarantee an accused an
opportunity to exercise his fifth amendment rights. 384 U.S. at 467. The Tucker Court
ultimately concluded that it is possible for the police to violate the prophylactic rules
developed to protect the right against self-incrimination while not directly infringing upon
a defendant's fifth amendment rights. 417 U.S. at 444.
'60 See, e.g., Comment, The Effects of Tucker on the "Fruits" of Illegally Obtained
Statements, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 689 (1975).
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C. The Stevens Dissent
Justice Stevens, who did not participate in the Court's deliberations
of Hale, authored the dissenting opinion in Doyle. He was joined in
his dissent by Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun. 16' The extensive
analysis contained in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion provided a
fitting counterpoint to the terse majority statement, in which the Court
relied heavily on Hale in lieu of an enunciated rationale for its decision.
Justice Stevens' substantive analysis of the due process implica-
tions of the use of post-arrest silence for impeachment, however, is
flawed from the outset by an error which had previously plagued the
Fifth Circuit: 6 2  the substitution of presumption for proof. His
analysis commenced with a conclusion, "the defendants' silence at the
time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with their trial testi-
mony . . . . 163 His observation was based on the presumption,
unsupported by a demonstrated rationale, that persons who have ac-
tually been "framed" will invariably protest their situation to the ar-
resting officers, notwithstanding the fact that they have been advised
that they need not speak.16 4
Stevens concluded from this presumption that post-arrest silence
constituted an "inconsistent statement and is admissible for purposes
of impeachment."16 5  Two inaccurate bases of this assertion taken
together, tend to diminish its authoritative value; first, the construc-
tion of ambiguous silence as a "statement" is questionable; 6 6 second,
the Wigmore statement to which Justice Stevens referred has been
qualified in light of the Miranda dictum.
167
Justice Stevens particularly emphasized the variety of responses
made by the defendants to the prosecutor's questioning at trial. In an
extensive footnote, he cited their testimony in this regard to illustrate
that both defendants tendered numerous reasons at trial for their
failure to initially proffer the "frame" defense. 168  Justice Stevens
assumed that if the defendants remained silent in response to the
Miranda warnings, they would have indicated this during cross-ex-
amination. The cited sections of the transcript, however, reveal that
the defendants were never specifically asked by the prosecutor why
1ll 96 S. Ct. at 2246-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens succeeded to the
Court seat formerly occupied by Justice Douglas, who authored a concurring opinion in
Hale. 422 U.S. at 182.
162 The Fifth Circuit error was most notably exemplified in Ramirez v. United States,
441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1971). See text at notes 32-41 supra.
,63 96 S. Ct. at 2246.
154 See text at notes 40-41 supra for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's presumption
regarding a defendant's silence at arrest advanced in Ramirez. See also text at notes 42-44
supra for an analysis of United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1975), in
which the Fifth Circuit implicitly rejected the Ramirez approach, instead adopting a "blat-
ant inconsistency" test to determine the probative value of such silence.
165 96 S. Ct. at 2246.
'6 See text at notes 54-59 supra.
167 See text at notes 60-64 supra.
t6 96 S. Ct. at 2246 n.4.
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they had remained silent. 69  Justice Stevens did not analyze the
defendants' actual statements; rather, he asserted, on the basis of
his presumptions, that the fact that the defendants did not claim that
they had relied on the Miranda warnings but tendered "a different
jumble of responses" in explanation of their silence, "negate[s] the
Court's presumption that their silence was induced by reliance on
deceptive advice."'
' 70
This assertion heightens two misinterpretations of the majority
opinion which are evident throughout Justice Stevens' opinion. First,
the majority did not perceive the Miranda warnings to be per se de-
fective. Close examination of the majority opinion reveals that its
complaint regarding deceptiveness was not with the content of the
Miranda warnings, but with the subsequent use of a defendant's si-
lence following the administration of the warning.' 7 1  Secondly, the
majority did not contend, as Justice Stevens asserted, that the silence
of the defendants was induced by the Miranda warnings. The Court
construed the silence as "insolubly ambiguous,"' 2 attributable to any
one of a number of factors - including the administration of Miranda
warnings. The majority, therefore, concluded that an examination of
the arrestee's motives for silence could not yield an accurate finding
regarding the particular influence of the warnings on such silence. 17 3
In finding a deprivation of due process in the use of ambiguous post-
arrest silence to impeach a defendant at trial, the majority impliedly
determined that the potential constitutional violations resulting from
impeachment by silence outweighed any benefits to be derived from
allowing the impeachment because of its probative value, and that
this factor justified the adoption of a per se exclusionary rule against
the prosecutorial use of such silence.174
169 Id.
170 Id. at 2246-47. Justice Stevens might have strengthened his argument had he ana-
lyzed the statements made by defendants during cross-examination solely in terms of de-
fendant Doyle's initial willingness to speak to arresting officers and later refusal to answer
questions. This defendant's inconsistency in answering police questions tended to indicate
that Doyle's silence could be attributed to more than a reliance on the Miranda warnings
and thus, arguably, that his silence was of some probative value. Although the possible
probative value of such conduct was not specifically discussed in Hale, it would seem
that this factor might be relevant to the quest to determine the reasons for a defendant's
silence. As previously discussed, the Hale Court posited factors which might demonstrate
good reason for a defendant's failure to answer police interrogation. Upon a finding
of any of these factors, the defendant would, according to Hale, be free from prosecutorial
cross-examination concerning his silence at the police station. See text at notes 94-96
supra.
171 96 S. Ct. at 2244-45.
172 Id. at 2244.
1 3 The Doyle Court noted that it was not concerned with a determination of the proba-
tive value of post-arrest silence, for it had undertaken such an inquiry in Hale. 96 S. Ct.
at 2244 n.8. The Doyle majority suggested that its inquiry in Hale had provided addi-
tional explanations, apart from the effect of the Miranda warnings, for the ambiguities
inhercot in post-arrest silence. Id. Justice Stevens failed to consider these other explana-
tions in his analysis; he seemed to regard the effect of the Airanda warnings as the only
factor in the arrest situation which would tend to make such silence ambiguous. 96 S. Ct.
at 224647.
'7, See 96 S. Ct. at 2244.
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Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the Court did presume that the
defendants' silence was induced by reliance on Miranda warnings, Jus-
tice Stevens failed to demonstrate how the defendants' responses served
to "negate" this presumption. Justice Stevens merely characterized the
responses as "jumble.' 5  This observation is not instructive regarding
the probative value of the post-arrest silence, and merely suggests that
Justice Stevens deplored the defendants' inability to articulate their
defense at trial. Justice Stevens did not undertake the type of extensive
analysis of these remarks which his pointed conclusion would appear to
warrant, a factor which deprived his argument of the substantive analy-
sis necessary to be convincing.7 6
The crowning blow in Stevens' attack on the majority's "due process"
rationale came in the form of another dubious proposition. Justice Stev-
ens suggested that defendants' "jumble" of responses at trial rebutted
the presumption that their silence was attributable to reliance on the
Miranda warnings and that the majority's due process argument, based
on that presumption, correspondingly collapsed. 7 7  More specifically,
he contended that the demise of the reliance presumption made the
Doyle case analogous to a case where no warning is given and, more-
over, that nothing in the Court's opinion alluded to unfairness in using
defendants' prior inconsistent silence for impeachment in situations in
which no warning was proffered. In effect Stevens asserted: If the police
didn't say the words, then the silence of the defendants is not protected.
The Court in Miranda anticipated this type of argument and explicitly
provided that:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system
of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate
warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant
was aware of his rights without a warning being given. 7 '
Thus, if the warnings had not been afforded in the Doyle case, the prose-
cution still would have been unable to establish that fact to form a basis
115 Id. at 2246.
176 The primary thrust of the Miranda warnings in the arrest situation is that the de-
fendant be notified that he is under no compulsion to speak. Thus, in light of Miranda,
the significant instance of behavior in the Doyle case was the defendant's refusal to re-
spond to police questioning. The fact that Doyle made some tangential remarks to the
police in the few hours following his custody did not necessarily emasculate his exer-
cise of the right to remain silent. In fact, if the remarks made were consistent with
his trial testimony, they would tend to strengthen the defendant's case. An examination of
the sections of the transcripts of the Wood and Doyle trials cited in Justice Stevens' opin-
ion reveals only that defendant Doyle actually spoke when arrested and that his utterances
consisted primarily of variations on the theme of "I don't know what you are talking
about" when the arresting officer accused him of selling marijuana. Transcript of Doyle
Trial 506-07, quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2247. These remarks were ostensibly consistent with
defendants' trial testimony. Justice Stevens, by his reference to the "jumble" of defen-
dants' post-arrest responses, merely introduced a red herring into the legal inquiry.
177 96 S. Ct. at 2247-48.
171 384 U.S. at 468.
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for admission of defendant's silence for impeachment purposes. 79 More-
over, prior to the requirement of Miranda warnings, courts widely rec-
ognized that evidence of post-arrest silence should have been excluded
in almost all criminal cases since the admission of this evidence dan-
gerously burdened the defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment
privilege by penalizing him for such exercise.180
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by proposing that the defen-
dant's silence at the time of arrest is a proper subject of inquiry during
cross-examination and that, therefore, the defendant should be sub-
jected to such questioning whether or not that silence seemed "incon-
sistent" with his trial testimony.'8 ' He further suggested that a de-
fendant, who attested that he had remained silent in reliance on the Miranda
warnings, could actually have his credibility reinforced by such testi-
mony, if that testimony was not contradicted by his conduct at the time
of arrest. In effect, Justice Stevens would have the trial proceed on
the assumption that all silence at the time of arrest is per se probative
and thus admissible on the issue of the defendant's credibility. He would
propose that the defendant be given the opportunity to try to explain
away any negative inferences which could be drawn from that silence.
This approach is antithetical to the conclusion of the Court in Hale: the
danger that a jury will infer guilt from the circumstance of silence at
arrest is so manifestly great as to militate against the use of silence for
impeachment purposes in almost every case. 1 82
Justice Stevens' treatment of the fifth amendment issue, presented
by the defendants but not addressed in the majority opinion, does not
bear extensive scrutiny. He attempted to resurrect the pronouncement
of the Court in Raffel v. United States permitting the use of silence at a
prior trial to impeach the defendant's testimony at a later trial.18 3
Raffel was found inapplicable to the situation of impeachment by post-
arrest silence by the Court in Hale,18 and was all but overruled by the
Court in Grunewald v. United States.8 5 Justice Stevens acknowledged
this fact in a footnote; but nevertheless, he persisted in suggesting
that Raffel might yet have bearing on the Doyle case.18 6
Justice Stevens reserved the commentary most favorable to the de-
fendants until the closing lines of his dissent, where he concluded that
the defendants' silence at the preliminary hearing and during the pre-
trial period was not a proper subject for comment because this silence
was probably induced at the behest of counsel. 17  Therefore, Justice
179 Presumably, due to their cognizance of this fundamental procedural obstacle, no
court has proposed that post-arrest silence would be made admissible by the fact that the
Miranda warnings had not been given.
110 See, e.g., Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210 (1963).
181 96 S. Ct. at 2248.
182 422 U.S. at 180.
183 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
184 422 U.S. at 175-76. See text at notes 72-77 supra.
185 353 U.S. 391, 418-24 (1957). See text at note 92 supra.
186 96 S. Ct. at 2251 n.il.
187 Id. at 2250-52. The Doyle majority did not consider these issues, for they based
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Stevens seems to suggest that the defendant may be expected to spon-
taneously inform the arresting officers of his trial defense only until his
attorney arrives; at that point, the expectation ceases, since the present-
ment of the defense is then in the hands of counsel. This proposition
posits the anomaly of conditioning the defendant's full enjoyment of his
right to remain silent upon the prompt appearance of his attorney. It
not only implies a myriad of potential due process and sixth amendment
violations1 88 but, together with the constitutional obstacles which militate
against impeachment by use of silence discussed in the majority opinion,
threatens the constitutional and equitable administration of criminal jus-
tice. These arguably unconstitutional implications of Justice Stevens'
approach may serve to explain why Chief Justice Burger, who gave
every indication in Hale that he would strenuously resist a constitutional
prohibition against impeachment by silence,18 9 joined the Doyle major-
ity opinion.' 90 The problems engendered by permitted impeachment
by silence, amply illustrated by the tenuous reasoning in the Stevens
dissent, are so overwhelming that a per se prohibitive rule against such
silence seems to be the only sensible means to resolve this controversy.
CONCLUSION
It is not difficult to predict the effect of Doyle on the federal court
system as well as on the courts of the various states. Doyle effectively
imposes a per se exclusionary rule on the use of post-arrest silence
against a defendant at trial, thus giving the force of law to the Miranda
dictum. 191 Based upon the doctrine of "elementary fairness" implicit in
the fourteenth amendment due process clause, 192 the greatest accom-
plishment of Doyle is that it provides a precedent which should have a
benign effect on the administration of justice. The Hale decision entailed
a judicial investigation of the evidentiary value of silence; it avoided
the due process questions presented by the use of post-arrest silence
for impeachment purposes. Although the findings in Hale were expressly
relied on by the Doyle Court, i9 3 those findings had failed to achieve
the stated end of that decision - to resolve court conflict over impeach-
their holding entirely upon consideration of the propriety of comment on defendants' silence
immediately following arrest. Id. at 2244 n.6.
188 Cf. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements of defendant, made after
Miranda warnings and a request for counsel, but before counsel arrived, held admissible for
impeachment purposes).
189 422 U.S. at 181.
90 It is somewhat ironic that Justice Stevens sought to discredit the majority viewpoint
by his observation that Chief Justice Warren, author of the Miranda majority opinion,
joined the majority in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (evidence deemed
inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief was not thereby made inadmissible
for purposes of impeachment). His observation might have been persuasive had Chief
Justice Burger, author of the majority opinion in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(evidence excluded because of Miranda violation admissible for impeachment purposes),
not joined the majority in Doyle.
"I1 See 3A J. \VicmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1042 n.I. (J. Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970) for a listing
of state court cases which have considered the issue of impeachment by prior silence.
192 96 S. Ct. at 2245.
'93 Id. at 2244-45.
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ment by silence. 94 This conflict could only be concluded with a consti-
tutional decision concerning the use of post-arrest silence to impeach a
defendant's trial testimony. The Court avoided such a decision until the
Doyle case.
By adopting a per se exclusionary rule which prohibits the prosecu-
torial use of post-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's testimony at
trial, the Doyle Court removed the determination of a constitutionally
sensitive issue from the purview of trial court discretion. The Court thus
eliminated a potential source of injustice by obviating the arbitrary spec-
ulation inherent in any investigation seeking to determine the probative
value of a defendant's post-arrest silence. 95 Moreover, the Doyle de-
cision ensures a defendant in a criminal prosecution against conviction
on the basis of his silence at the time of arrest, when he was expressly
told that he need not speak. To those who have witnessed the steady
erosion of the foundations of Miranda' 96 the Court's decision in Doyle
provides somewhat comforting assurance that judicial balance is not al-
ways achieved by a shifting to the opposite extreme.
F. RONALD O'KEEFE
'"Id. at 2244; United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 173 (1975).
115 See text at notes 94-96 supra.
196 See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
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